A Land Grab in the territories

Well well well, this just sounds delicious. Lebanon's becoming free! The Iranians are... going to do whatever. And Syria is cornered. Gaza's on its way to becoming a cleared territory... Hm. Maybe things will wrap themselves up neatly. But it never goes that way.

The Kurdish areas--Kirkuk, Mosul regions--are not likely to remain stable. The Iranians are still pursuing their nukes and the U.S. and Israeli hawks are croaking at a fever pitch. Lebanon may be without a stabilizing force of any sort, and they could all turn against each other in a little while.

This writeup concerns the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The stuff about Syria and Lebanon I'm putting in another. Here we have a collection of stories mostly from EI and Haaretz, two fairly well respected sources on opposite sides.

The U.S. government now says that there are slightly more Palestinians than Israelis living in the ol' Mandatory Palestine, Making the demographics and the claim to the West Bank all the more absurd.

Meanwhile in Israel it's on the settlers and the right-wing members of the military to make their move. They are locking a land-grab in the West Bank with a new Morally Approved fence route, designed to contain more illegal settlements--and about a quarter-million Palestinians. The airstrikes against Palestinians have not really stopped, and there is some sort of debate in their military complex about whether or not the vast housing demolitions actually accomplish anything (By Zeev Schiff below) It is a positive step for the moment, praised by this Israeli peace org.

This story also is interesting because it ties to the issue of housing construction licenses, an important bureaucratic instrument used to justify demolition and carry out the cleansing of Palestinians, even throughout the 1990s. The nasty land confrontations are still going on and it's really "Unilateral give, unilateral take" (this story from the always interesting electronicintifada.net)

Housing demolitions story by Zeev Schiff:

The family of suicide bomber Abdallah Badran, who killed five Israelis and wounded another 50, need not worry. Two weeks ago, the defense minister approved a decision by the chief of staff to halt the practice of demolishing the homes of suicide terrorists. Even if they capture the person who sent the murderer, according to the new decision, his home will not be destroyed. And if there is a decision in the future to once again demolish homes, B'Tselem will once again demand that Israel pay damages to the family of the suicide bomber.

The current decision was made in the wake of a recommendation by a committee headed by Maj. Gen. Udi Shani that doubted whether house demolitions were a factor in deterring terror. According to that logic, buildings constructed without a license by the occupied population in the territories cannot be destroyed because it won't deter others from building without licenses. There are also family members who live in those buildings who also were not involved in breaking the law. And it could be argued that the thousands of Palestinian detainees, the assassinations and the other steps in the war against terror did not deter others from joining the uprising and committing acts of violence.

The representative of the Shin Bet in the Shani committee opposed the ruling that demolishing the home of a suicide terrorist does not deter at all, and presented proof to back up his argument. When the issue was brought to the forum of the general staff, there was a debate because it was difficult to quantify the intensity of the deterrence.

It turns out that during the discussions, the committee's mandate was broadened to deal with the matter of homes demolished during combat. It distinguished between justified demolition resulting from operational needs, when a force is fighting for its life, and demolition for observation purposes (the practice known as "exposure") or for protecting the border, as in the Philadelphi corridor region. Some parts of the report have not been published.
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What will happen if terror resumes? The lawyers have the feeling that in any case, there will not be a resumption of the house demolitions only for the purpose of deterrence, a method used by the British on an enormous scale during the Arab Uprising in the Land of Israel. The committee report says that "an extreme change" would return the situation to the status quo ante. They did not define "extreme change."

The Israeli-Palestinian peace political partisan pair Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo write that what's going on now is still land theft, perpetuating the conflict:

A physical barrier constructed without Palestinian consent, inside Palestinian territory, leaves more than a quarter of a million Palestinians involuntarily annexed to "barrier-delineated" Israel. Tens of thousands of settlers remain on the "Palestinian side." The barrier will eventually be dismantled or moved. But for Palestinians, the fabric of daily life is further ruptured.

For Israelis, every revision and extra unnecessary kilometer of barrier takes resources away from desperately needed social budgets, while gaping holes remain in construction, as even the Sharon government hesitates to defy the Israeli Supreme Court, the Hague ruling and the U.S. government.

We are not against a physical as well as a political border, and fences may make for good neighbors. But not when the fence is in the neighbor's garden. It is an agreed border regime that will look after both peoples, the best security guarantee. In the Geneva Initiative, we reached an agreed border - the detailed maps can be viewed at www.geneva-accord.org - based on the 1967 lines with minor mutual modifications, and a land swap that addresses both Israeli and Palestinian needs.

But it is the guiding policy of this decision that is equally troubling. The unilateralism that has characterized the last few years must now become the language of the past. With one hand the Sharon government met the outstretched Palestinian hand at Sharm, but with the other hand it continues to sign unilateral edicts that shape our shared future.

The unilateral policy had two components: one side exclusively defines what happens next and then implements these decisions alone. It seems that regarding implementation, the Israeli government has understood the need for coordination and cooperation. But this is not enough. The process itself, the parameters, the substance, must again be the result of a dialogue - and a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, not Israelis and Israelis. We must return to comprehensive negotiations.

The Gaza disengagement and unilateral West Bank barrier construction are connected in more ways than the Israeli government vote. Our concern is that this signifies the "morning after Gaza" intentions, namely a continued avoidance of permanent status talks and the creation of more facts on the ground that undermine the very viability of a two-state solution.

The temptation to go slowly, in measured steps, nothing too far-reaching, is perhaps human and understandable. But it is mistaken, and learns nothing from the past decade. The cruel terror attack in Tel Aviv is another example of what extremists can do to sabotage and wreck. It is in the interest of both our peoples to end this conflict - and soon. That is probably why in a recent poll published in Ha'aretz, 64 percent of Israelis and 54 percent of Palestinians supported the detailed content of the Geneva Initiative.

Interim arrangements and the avoidance of defining the endgame solutions are a recipe for encouraging extremists on both sides to torpedo every step along the way. Gradualism places an unbearable burden on any attempt to stabilize the security situation. Not defining the endgame feeds unnecessary fears and unrealistic dreams in both constituencies. In many respects, it may be easier to reach a permanent status agreement than an interim arrangement.

Of course, we both support an end of the occupation in Gaza. But the "morning after Gaza" is just around the corner, and those who wish this conflict to continue, or believe that it is our fate, are already planning their next moves. So it is not too early for the coalition of sanity on both sides to declare that after Gaza, no more unilateralism, no more interim solutions, end the uncertainty, end the conflict.

We find it instructive that in more than a year since the Geneva Initiative launching, no detailed alternative plan has been proposed for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even our critics appear to concede that if, or when, a solution is reached, it will be along the Geneva Initiative lines.

Amira Hass says that there is a sense that old corrupt games might return, that is, the fantasies laid over the Oslo process that ducked the inevitable impact of land theft for settlements might be returning today... the occupation just may lock itself in more tightly inside the West Bank. Amira Hass is really interesting about this, asking what the Palestinian "state" as such really exists for:

The excitement that accompanied the rejection of the original composition of the Palestinian government by the Palestinian Legislative Council last week blurred the fact that there was no debate about the purpose of the new Palestinian government.

There was no challenge to the way the Palestinian governments since 1994 have perceived their function as "governments of the nascent state." It is a concept that has been accepted alongside the belief - once shared by many Israelis - that all it takes is a vaguely worded agreement to create a dynamic that will necessarily lead to a state. In other words, the belief that the liberation of the territory in which that state will exist will take place on its own.

But it is precisely the thesis of Oslo, that the process would inherently lead to a Palestinian state worthy of the name, that collapsed. The Oslo years proved that Israeli governments exploited the period of negotiations to strengthen the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. That construction, which goes on to this very day, undermines the chance to reach a peace agreement based on an independent Palestinian state beside Israel.

In the Oslo years, Yasser Arafat and the bridesmaids of the agreement were eager to behave as if there already was a state and not even one in formation. Arafat loved the title "President of the State of Palestine," and enjoyed nurturing the mechanisms of power and coercion that belong to real states. With a limited budget, he continued paying disgraceful salaries to the employees most vital for a future Palestinian state, particularly health and education professionals. Thus he gave up the necessary conditions for the process of national liberation: creating social solidarity and investment in the human potential of all social classes.

The mechanisms of charity and corrupt racketeering were able to thrive precisely because the PA's leadership gave up any attempt to create a welfare society, meaning a decent distribution of wealth, and in that way win the confidence of the public.

European countries and the U.S. also wanted to see a state in "Palestine." They dumped the dreary duty of treating Israel as an occupying power, which continues to control all the land reserves of the nascent state. Like today, at the London meeting, they invested efforts in monitoring the early failures and corruption of the Palestinian regime. Like today, in London, alongside the sloganeering about two states, they allowed Israel to continue its blatantly corrupt and anti-democratic actions: the theft of the land of the Palestinian people. With their generous contributions to the PA, they regulated and continue to regulate the levels of damage done by the occupation.
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The Palestinian people is capable of withstanding terrible trials and tribulations: physical, psychological and economic. It can certainly face those trials if they become a means within the context of planned, coordinated and deliberately led strategic action meant to break the rules of the game that faked peace and statehood, rules that were set down in the days of Oslo and are coming back to deceive us now once again.

Haaretz - Israel News - Zionist zealotry is not necessarily religious:

Most of those who object to the disengagement are religious, a fact that distorts the ability to understand their worldview.

Thus, for example, most people tend to assume that religious groups' objection to the pullout derives from their preference of the Torah laws to the laws of the state. Such circles no doubt exist, headed by the rabbis who issue halakhic rulings forbidding the evacuation of settlements in the name of the Torah. Their disciples, the students of the Orthodox-national yeshivas, are also part of these circles.

They should be reminded that the religious establishment has agreed to accept halakhic violations no less severe than evacuating settlements - first and foremost the acceptance of a non-halakhic justice system - in order to maintain and preserve the national homeland.

It is a common misconception that messianic beliefs are by their very nature more extreme than others. Those who have a messianic view of the state, to which they attribute a "redemptionist" religious status, are in fact more likely to uphold moderate positions, because of the very sacredness they attribute to the state.

This explains Rabbi Shlomo Aviner's public stand against disobeying orders to carry out the evacuation, while at the same time advocating that individuals use every means to evade actions that aid the evacuation, as suggested by Rabbi Zvi Tau, the leader of the "messianic line."

In contrast, Rabbi Avraham Shapira, who is not "messianic" but a halakhic man par excellence, rules unequivocally to refuse the evacuation, because the state in itself has no holiness. As far as he is concerned, the evacuation order should be seen as any other order to violate halakha.

However, all this rabbinic argument is restricted to a minority. Most religious people who object to the disengagement, headed by the leaders of Yesha (Council of Settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District), are not motivated by religion. Their readiness to accept the results of a referendum proves this. A religious person would not subject his religious values to a referendum, not even for manipulative purposes.

Why then are they fighting so insistently, with some of them even willing to violate orders and laws?

For one thing, they feel that the decision-making process was not democratic. Another reason is that for segments of religious Zionism, Zionist values themselves, like settlements, have acquired an "Orthodox" status stronger than any halakhic principle.

This reasoning leads to the conclusion that Zionist zealotry could be no less dangerous than religious zealotry. Another conclusion is that religious Zionism, among other groups, should launch a comprehensive public and educational debate about the proper relation between the Land of Israel and the settlements in it, and the State of Israel and Zionism.

According to the original Zionist concept, the settlements are a central means for setting up a sovereign national home. However, if settlement endangers the national home - as in areas where the settlement would endanger a Jewish majority and therefore sovereignty - it must be rejected.

A third conclusion, and perhaps the most urgent, is that most of the objectors to the disengagement share the code of values of its supporters. In other words, the state and democracy take precedence even over the Land of Israel. We may reject their demand for a referendum or even suspect their motives, but it would be wrong to lump them together with those advocating disobedience to orders and brand them as a "menace to democracy."

Moreover, portraying them, in the words of the ironic old Jewish adage, as "robbed Cossacks" might drive them into the arms of the zealots. In a society where murderers and terrorists can demand human rights, there is no place for presenting all the settlers as a sector whose complaints are unworthy of hearing. After all, their main "crime" is pressuring the government and manipulating the authorities. They are no more "robbed Cossacks" than Ariel Sharon, who is suddenly expressing dread of "the danger to democracy."

Meanwhile, this stuff just amazes me. Now there have been Halakhic (Jewish religious law) rulings from some extremists that allow non-Jewish members of the IDF to be shot at during settlement evacuations. In turn, a local sheik has issued a counter-fatwa. So this is how religious warfare is formalized between segments of Israeli society: Haaretz - Fatwa allows Bedouin soldiers to return fire in evacuation:

A Bedouin Sheikh issued Wednesday an Islamic ruling under which Beduoin soldiers who take part in the evacuation of settlements were allowed to protect themselves even at the price of hurting settlers.

The Islamic ruling, or Fatwa, issued by Sheikh Kamel Abu Nadi comes after reports appeared that rabbis had issued a halakhic ruling permitting live fire on Druze and Bedouin soldiers and police officers who take part in evacuating settlements under the disengagement plan.

"Many soldiers and officers have turned to me during the last week asking what they should do in the event that they were fired on during evacuation," Abu Nadi said.

"In reaction I issued a Fatwa that if they can not avoid taking part in the evacuation and were fired on, they should return fire in order to protect themselves," Abu Nadi said.

Bazam Nafez Abulqian, an Israel Defense Forces major in the reserve and chairman of the Bedouin soldier and officer association, turned Wednesday to Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and Attorney General Menachem Mazuz in a request to deal severely with right-wing inciters.

"After years where Bedouin soldiers served and protected settlers all over the country, they are suddenly abandoned and people distinguish their blood from blood of Jewish soldiers?" Abulqian asked angrily.