The workings of Hamas

A while ago I stumbled on a large booklet describing the funding and operational organization of Al Qaeda and its Southeast Asia affiliate Jamaat Islamiya. (spellings vary :) The book featured a good deal of interesting evidence about how Al Qaeda operates through charities, front companies, the hawala money networks and so forth. But it also had charts laying out the structures of contemporary JI and Al Qaeda, as well as the more theoretical designs of how terror networks are laid out.

Later that day I found a couple stories about Hamas and its workings, which are quite a bit more complex than the suicide bomb factories and occasional welfare handouts that the media caricatures lead us to believe. I oppose Hamas' goals and methods as ghastly and counterproductive to the Palestinian people, but I am intrigued by how the organization has numerous branches and an all-pervasive social structure in Palestinian society that replaces the fading and highly dysfunctional Palestinian Authority. I'm also alarmed by the burgeoning operation of Hamas-related schools for the youngsters, because by teaching intolerance you get into more feedback loops of violence.

This feature about the late Sheik Yassin on the Palestine Chronicle delineates the development of Hamas over several decades. Sources like this certainly have their biases, and this particular article has a rather passive view of suicide bombings, but nonetheless sheds light on a very shadowy organization:

The Brotherhood's strategy was to create a decentralized yet hierarchical system of operations. Hamas is composed of administrative, charitable, political, and military elements, which have subdivisions. The administrative wing coordinates the movement's actions. Charity work is conducted in cooperation with other centers sympathetic to Hamas. The political activity that takes place within the territories is confined to Hamas sympathizers participating in union and university elections. Externally, Hamas has information and political offices in a number of neighboring states. The "military" wing, known as the Izzedin Qassam Brigades, is responsible for combating the occupation.

Since the founders were Brethren, Hamas' structure borrows from the movement. For example, each region is comprised of "families" and branches, answerable to an administrative center. Hamas members, however, are not singular in capacity. There are four general categories in which they fall—intelligentsia, sheikhs (religious leaders), professionals, and activists. Contrary to media reports claiming that zealots from poverty-stricken areas lead the movement, "among [its leaders] are intellectuals, bourgeoisie and educated people far from the bottom rungs of the social ladder".
.....
Yassin was among the first leading moderates in Hamas jailed by Israel; but not the last. Israel’s arm also reached across the Atlantic, encouraging America’s incarceration of Musa Abu Marzuq, former chief of Hamas’ political wing and a key component of the movement’s pragmatic elements.

Although Israel may have assumed such moves would hamper, or possibly end, Hamas activities, the opposite occurred. Israel altered the political rather than military direction Hamas was moving in; and inadvertently helped hard-liners. In recent years, it has been increasingly difficult to convince, or be convinced, that restraint is the right strategy. And leaders who had previously held convincing arguments against mass violence, are have become less able to dissuade Hamas’ unregimented military arm, the Izzedin Qassam Brigades, to temper their activities.

The Qassam Brigades are divided into independent cells of five to ten combatants. The total number of hard core fighters is estimated at around 100, although many more sympathizers claim to be part of these cells. Following repeated Israeli crackdowns, these cells have distanced themselves from the political leadership. They give Hamas their allegiance and are bound to its general long-term goals; yet do not report their plans or activities to the political hierarchy, thus avoiding detection by Israeli and Palestinian Authority security services.

I would say that it is accurate that Israel in fact encouraged increased militancy in Hamas by going after the more moderate factional leaders. Israel has done this all the time, and then claims no moral difference between killing any and all leaders of whatever stripe. It works to the Likud's favor to eliminate the more moderate leaders. When they are gone, the movement is further radicalized (and deemed to have had its true nature finally revealed) and the peace process gets nowhere. Were the 'pragmatic elements' ever potentially helpful? We will never know, since we were only left with the remnants.

Also it is very important to note how the cells absorb a certain array of operating principles but then operate independently. To an extent this also seems to be the Al Qaeda-linked pattern of activity. As people say, Osama bin Laden was really trying to franchise the operation, and 3/11 perhaps proved the success of the business model.

In any case, if and when the Israelis withdraw from Gaza, the Palestinians are considering holding elections, where Hamas supporters could quite possibly take a plurality of the vote. Wouldn't that be funny?

Corruption up and down

Willie Safire, among others, has been complaining for a while now about what he calls 'Kofigate.' Allegations are developing that the former UN oil-for-food program run under sanctions was swamped with corruption and kickbacks at all levels, diverting legitimate money intended for Iraqis and also possibly channeling extra oil through 'oil vouchers.'

A high-ranking UN official has been implicated in the scheme, and as many are saying it couldn't come at a worse time because the UN is supposed to be helping Iraq transition to a new government now.

The UN has launched a major investigation.

This also goes along with more recent allegations of corruption in the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council that I mentioned before, in particular because the IGC was allowed to hand over ministerial positions to their cousins and such, causing the growth of patronage and factionalization.

Juan Cole has posted his testimony to Congress about the mess in Iraq. He was also on a panel next to the maddening Richard Perle (thank you to Cole for noting the settler connection!):

It is deeply shameful that Perle is still pushing Chalabi, and may well succeed in installing him. Chalabi is wanted for embezzling $300 million from a Jordanian bank. He cannot account for millions of US government money given him from 1992 to 1996. He was flown into Iraq by the Pentagon (Perle was on the Defense Advisory Board, a civilian oversight committee for the Pentagon) with a thousand of his militiamen. The US military handed over to Chalabi, a private citizen, the Baath intelligence files that showed who had been taking money from Saddam, giving Chalabi the ability to blackmail large numbers of Iraqi and regional actors. It was Chalabi who insisted that the Iraqi army be disbanded, and Perle almost certainly was an intermediary for that stupid decision. It was Chalabi who insisted on blacklisting virtually all Baath Party members, even if they had been guilty of no crimes, effectively marginalizing all the Sunni Iraqi technocrats who could compete with him for power. It was Chalabi who finagled his way onto the Interim Governing Council even though he has no grassroots support (only 0.2 percent of Iraqis say they trust him).

Now Chalabi's nephew Salem has been put in charge of the trial of Saddam Hussein. Salem is a partner in Zell and Feith, a Jerusalem-based law firm headed by a West Bank settler, in which Douglas Feith, the undersecretary of Defense for Planning, is also a senior partner when not in the US government. You can be assured that the trial will be conducted on behalf of the Bush administration and the Neocons, and on behalf of the Chalabis. Since the Chalabis have been trying to overthrow Saddam for decades, it is hard to see how this can have even the appearance of an impartial tribunal.

Anyway, Perle was just a one-note Johnny, with his whole message being "We must give away Iraq to Ahmad Chalabi yesterday! That will solve all the problems."

If the Bush administration listens to Perle and puts Chalabi in as a soft dictator, it will be the final nail in the coffin of the Iraq enterprise. The whole thing is already going very badly wrong. Chalabi will play iceberg to the Iraq/Bush Titanic.

It would be really interesting to know the list of secret promises Chalabi has given Perle (and presumably the Israelis through Perle) that would explain this Neocon fervor for the man.

Does Iraq just corrupt everyone and everything it touches??!

In other news a woman was fired for taking a picture of flag-draped coffins coming back from Iraq, and she has also complained about sexist treatment of Halliburton employees in the past, it seems. (I had a feeling they would get her)

Speculations of a wider war unfolding, and "Apocalypse Phase," a cool piece from Monbiot about Christian fundamentalism propelling our policy in the Mideast.

The UN envoy Brahimi is criticizing how tilted towards Israel Bush is behaving, making it more difficult to form a new Iraqi government. Yes this is very important--a central tension in the hegemon.

According to Josh Marshall the CPA's website is actually a ripoff of the Brookings Institution's, a sublime irony that I verified by looking at the CPA site's code, which is full of tags with the same names as the Brookings' menu. Also the background pattern is the same. This shoddy website plagarism says more about our work in Iraq than anything else I could imagine....